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TASK 1A MCES REVIEW & MEB APPLICATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The (MCES) is a general approach to evaluating C3 systems which has
been successfully applied to a number of issues concerning C3 system
planning, acquisition, testing and operation. It augments traditional analysis
by providing a series of seven steps or modules to evaluate alternative C3
systems and architectures. These modules guide analysts who might
otherwise focus prematurely on the quantitative model rather than the
problem definition and the specific measures needed to discriminate between
alternatives. The seven steps of the MCES are briefly described below
including the product of each module.
The MCES begins by identifying the objective of a particular application.
This leads to a formal problem statement. The second step is to bound the C3
system involved, by producing a complete list of system elements at several
levels. The third step is building a dynamic framework that identifies the
relevant C3 process—a set of functions. These are derived from the generic
control loop (cybernetic) model of C3. The fourth step combines the results of
steps two and three by integrating the system elements and the process
functions into a model or representation of the C3 system. The product of
this module is at least a complete descriptive conceptual model and
sometimes a complete mathematical model. The next (fifth) step is to
specifically identify measures of performance, effectiveness and force
effectiveness at the corresponding levels of the C3 system and function. The
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
sixth step is to generate results or values for these measures by testing,
simulation, computational modeling or subjective evaluation. Finally, the
various measures are aggregated and interpreted in the last step. Each of
those steps is described as a module below.
In a new area such as C3, standard language and paradigms are difficult
but necessary. The MCES was developed by a team of experts from industry,
government and academia and was endorsed by the Military Operations
Research Society. It presents difficult concepts in a standardized way that is
easily absorbed by both new practitioners and managers. MCES has potential
for reducing mis-understandings of the purpose and mis-applicability of
analytical results. This is important when issues of great diversity of nature,
size and level of detail are being considered, such as in preparation of the
Program Objective memoranda (POM). Standardization of analytical
procedure can be advantageous if based on a comprehensive and rigorous
methodology such as MCES. MCES can be used for studies ranging from the
quick conceptual level to the complete quantitative study. It is difficult if not
impossible to require a complete quantitative study for each issue during a
POM cycle, as is required for acquisition cycle issues with the Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). But application of the MCES at
even the conceptual level of analysis may allow better articulation of POM
tradeoffs. The next section is an exposition of the substance of the MCES.
This serves as preparation for the required interpretation of the MCES in
terms of the MEB C3 problem as specified in Task 1. It will then be followed
by application of the MCES to the allocation of SEMCGARS as also required in
Taskl.
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
The seven steps of the MCES are performed iteratively with the decision
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MODULAR COMMAND AND CONTROL
EVALUATION STRUCTURE (MCES)
Figure 1. Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure
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prevents "paralysis by analysis." Iterative refinement of the problem and
analysis helps both the decision maker and the analyst to prevent studies
from being overtaken by events. The outputs of each step are also shown in
Figure 1. Each of the steps or modules is explained below.
B. MCES MODULES
1. Module 1: Problem Formulation
Module 1 describes the decision maker's objective and the context for a
specific C3 problem as shown in Figure 2. In it the formal decision process (if
any), the policy assumptions and the scope and depth of analysis are defined.
The identification of the full set of decision makers being addressed may be
necessary. In this module both the appropriate mission and scenario(s) are
made explicit. The output, a precise statement of the problem, is used in the
second module to bound the C3 system of interest.
The objectives of the decision maker(s) posing the problem are identified
in terms of the life cycle of the C3 system and the level of analysis prescribed.
The decision maker's objectives generally reflect the various phases of the life
cycle of the C3 system, namely: (1) concept definition and/or development;
(2) design; (3) acquisition; or (4) operations. The appropriate level of analysis
is derived from: (1) the mission the system is addressing; (2) the type of
system itself; (3) the timing, scope and criticality of decision; and (4) the
background and commitment of the decision maker(s). In this problem
formulation step, it is wise to make an initial pass at all the MCES steps with
the objective of identifying the range of likely answers for each module. This
helps scope the analytical effort as early as possible.
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Figure 2. MCES Problem Formulation
In the implementation of this step, the answers to several questions may
provide guidance, namely:
1. Who is/are the decision maker(s), and how and when will the
decisions be made?
2. What mission area is involved? Must joint or combined forces be
addressed?
3. What communities /viewpoints must be addressed for acceptance?
4. What are the basic assumptions of the problem? Classification level?
Historically how has the problem been solved?
5. Does the evaluation apply to an individual C3 system or require a
comparative evaluation of several alternative systems and /or forces?
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6. What threat and scenarios are appropriate and available?
7. What part of the life cycle of the C3 system is involved? Time frame?
8. What level (system, subsystem, platform, force, etc.) is the analysis
focused upon?
9. What type of measure, i.e., how quantitative, will answer the decision
maker's question?
10. What analytical support will be required? Testing? Simulation?
In summary, three steps take place in Module 1: (1) the decision maker's
needs are characterized; (2) the problem's scope and depth are selected; and (3)
the remaining modules are previewed for their potential impact on the
problem statement and analytical effort required.
2. Module 2: C3 System Bounding
Module 2, as described by Figure 3, enumerates the relevant system
elements that bound the problem of interest. The first goal is to delineate the
difference between the system being analyzed and its environment. To
bound the C3 system, the analyst should employ the three-part definition,
based upon JCS Publication 1. In it, a C3 system consists of: (1) physical
entities—equipment, software, people and their associated facilities; (2)
structure—organization, concepts of operation, standard operating
procedures, and patterns of information flow; and (3) process—the
functionality or "what the system is doing" which is pursued in Step 3. In the
second module the C3 system, identified by its human, hardware and
software entities and structures, is related to the forces it controls and the
environmental stimuli to which it responds, including the enemy. Once the
system elements of the problem have been identified, the C3 system of
interest may be further bounded by relating the "physical entities" and the
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
structure components to the graphic representation of the levels of analysis,






Figure 3. MCES C2 Systems Bounding
This series of levels is referred to as the "onion skin." In the most
inclusive depiction of this graphic, there are five rings. Beyond the outer ring
is the rest of the world, which essentially relates to elements and structure
that exist and may have import with respect to similar problems, but which
are outside the scope of the problem at hand. In contrast, the outer ring
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represents the environmental factors that require explicit assumptions in the
problem. This ring may be seen as including the major scenario components.
The next ring, moving inward, deals with the forces under influence of the
C3 system upon which the evaluation is centered. The C3 system itself is the
focus of the next ring, and its component subsystems make up the innermost
ring. As is clear from the foregoing, this graphic is a structured static display
of the physical entities.
Rest of World
Figure 4. C3 System Bounding and Level of Analysis
In summary, 1) the C3 system statics must be distinguished from the C3
system dynamics, the "C3 process" and its functions. 2) The statics must be be
listed as the physical entities together with the structural relationships of C3.
3) The structure is represented by the customary physical arrangement and
interrelationships of entities in the form of command structure, the standard
operating procedures, protocols, message formats and reporting requirements.
Bounding the C3 system often leads to broadening the system of interest. It
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
may be necessary to consider the source of information as well as the display
that is being decided upon in a particular decision.
3. Module 3: C3 Process Definition
After the system is bounded and the system elements identified, the
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Figure 5. C2 Process Definition
Module 3 focuses the analyst's attention on: (1) the environmental
"initiator" of the C3 process, which results from changes in the desired state,
usually of enemy forces; (2) the internal C3 process functions (sense, assess,
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generate, select, plan, direct); and (3) the input to and output from the
internal C3 process and the environment. The C3 process functions are
generic and may be adapted to the specific functions of air defense, ground
operations etc. They can be described briefly here as six function.
• Sense—the function that collects data necessary to describe and forecast
the environment, which includes:
(1) The enemy forces, disposition and actions.
(2) The friendly forces, disposition and actions.
(3) Those aspects of the environment that are common to both
forces—for example, weather, terrain and neutrals.
• Assess—the function that transforms data from the sense function into
information about intentions and capabilities of enemy forces and
about capabilities of friendly forces to determine if deviation from the
desired state warrants further action.
• Generate—the function that develops alternative courses of action to
correct deviations from the desired state.
• Select—the function that selects a preferred alternative from among
the available options. It includes evaluation of each option in terms of
criteria necessary to achieve the desired state.
• Plan—the function that develops implementation details necessary to
execute the selected course of action.
• Direct—the function that distributes decisions to the forces charged
with execution of the decision.
In summary, these six functions have been found to be sufficiently
comprehensive to map to almost any C3 process. They are applied iteratively.
4. Module 4: Integration of System Elements and Functions
As noted in Figure 6, in Module 4 the relationships between the physical
entities and structures (defined in Module 2) and the C3 processes or
functions (described in Module 3) are first identified and described—who does













Figure 6. Integration of System Elements and Functions
Petri nets may be used to model the messages or information flows that are
used to control these relationships. Information flows support decisions that
link the separate C3 functions into the architecture containing the relevant C3
system. The term "architecture" is used to describe the output of module 4 to
emphasize the integration via defined interfaces and standards of the
individual C3 subsystems. The physical entities, structures and functions of
these individual systems are coherently controlled in a dynamic architecture.
The architecture might indeed become a functioning computer model of the
system which would support an evaluation of mission effectiveness. The
final form of the architecture will at least include the process description of
11
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the system elements performing the processes arranged in a structural
framework as indicated in Figures 3-4. These may be adequate to support
qualitative evaluation of the architecture. A quantitative description of the
elements and the inputs to the processes are required even if a model cannot
be built in the time available. Even these descriptive inputs allow an
informal assessment on a subjective basis. In summary this module maps
Steps 2 and 3 together and provides quantitative information preferably as a
model of the architecture in a static and /or dynamic mode.
5. Module 5: Specification of Measures
A C3 measure can usually be categorized as either a performance measure
or a vulnerability measure. There are generic sets of both of these categories
such as the TRI-TAC MOEs shown in Table 1. These TRI-TAC measures are
generic and need additional specification in terms of a particular scenario and
C3 system. For example, the units of speed of service, interoperability and
survivability must be identified with reference to the mission and level of the
system.
TABLE 1. TRI-TAC MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
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In Module 5, as illustrated in Figure 7, the analyst specifies the measures
necessary to answer the problem of interest as defined in Module 1 and in the
system bounding process and integration. The component levels and
functions of the C3 system definition modules may be examined to derive an
initial set of relevant measures, which are then subjected to further scrutiny:
(1) comparison with a set of criteria, Table 2, which may reduce the number to
a more manageable set; (2) the remaining measures are then classified as to
their level of measurement (MOFE, MOE, MOP or parameter) which may
lead to association of some to a lower level than currently of interest;
(3) mapping of the MOFE to related MOEs and then to related MOPs, etc., and
(4) the resulting high level measures are examined for the practicability of
measuring alternative configurations of the physical entities, structure
and/or processes of the C3 system in the scenarios defined in Module 1.
Practicality often drives measurement down to the level of MOE or even
MOP because combat oriented measurements are inherently difficult.
TABLE 2. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION MEASURES
CHARACTERISTICS DEFINITION
Mission-oriented Relates to force/system mission
Discriminatory Identified real differences between alternatives
Measurable Can be computed or estimated
Quantitative Can be assigned numbers or ranked
Realistic Relates realistically to the C2 system and associated uncertainties
Objective Can be defined or derived, independent of subjective opinion
Appropriate Relates to acceptable standards and analysis objectives
Sensitive Reflects changes in system variables
Inclusive Reflects those standards required by the analysis objectives
Independent Is mutually exclusive with respect to other measures
Simplt Is easily understood bv the user
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
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Each of the three levels of the C3 system in the onion-skin diagram is
directly related to measures of performance (MOPs), measures of effectiveness







MOP (MEASEURES OF PERFORMANCE)
MOE (MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS)
MOFE (MEASURE OF FORCE EFFECTIVENESS)
Figure 7. Specification of Measures
The determination of the boundary helps to identify what level of
measure is appropriate. If the boundary between the force and the
environment is of interest, measures of force effectiveness (MOFE) are
required. Dealing with the boundary between force and the C3 system leads to
14
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measuring the effectiveness (MOE) of the C3 system. At the subsystem
level— that is within the boundary of the system—are measures of
performance (MOP) of the functions. Finally, within the subsystem are
Dimensional Parameters (DP). Measures at the higher level, MOFEs and
MOEs, are most desirable because they are closer to the ultimate purpose of
the C3 system and because they summarize many of the lower level measures
in a meaningful way.
In summary, this module's implementation results in the specification of
a set of measures that is focused on the C3 process functions within the C3
system, the overall performance of the C3 system and on the force
effectiveness of the C3 system combined with the forces and weapon systems,
if at all practical.
6. Module 6: Data Generation
The generation of values for the measures determined in the previous
module is addressed by the sixth module. These values are the result of the
implementation of this module as noted in Figure 8. Here, one of several
types of data generators such as exercises, experiments, simulations, models
or subjective judgement is selected. The MCES accommodates a variety of
data generators. The prime requirements are that the data generator is: (1)
available to the analysis; (2) focused on the mission area /analysis objectives of
the evaluation; and (3) adaptable to produce, with minimal modification, the
values associated with the measures specified in the previous module. The
analyst must consider the following: reproducibility of results, precision and
accuracy, costs and timing of data collection, environmental controls, and















Figure 8. Data Generation
This step is directly supported by Module 4, the integration of elements
and processes. If the integration has resulted in a quantitative model it will
be straightforward to generate output data. The verification of input data
from modules 2 and 3 and validation of the model must also be addressed.
Alternatively, if only a conceptual mapping of function to structure is
accomplished in Module 4, the generation of values for measures may be




In the typical implementation, the relationships established in module 4
are translated into computer code. In this process it will often be necessary to
define additional relationships and obtain more input data. The validation
and verification of this code as a representation of the problem must also be
addressed. The National Test Bed's Confidence Assessment Methodology is a
recommended reference for this step.
7. Module 7: Aggregation of Measures
In Module 6, Data Generation, the analyst obtains values for the specified
measures which will be analyzed and interpreted in this module as noted in
Figure 9. Because varying scenarios may be important for each iteration of
the MCES, the analyst must determine the importance of each factor. The
final module addresses the issue of how to aggregate and interpret the
measures. Three levels of measurement (performance, effectiveness and
force effectiveness) with multiple values from each level may be available.
The current state of the art requires that both qualitative (such as red-yellow-
green charts) and quantitative (such as utility weighting) aggregation
techniques be considered.
The nature of the problem and available tools determine the mix of these
techniques. Different problem areas addressing different decision makers'
analytic needs will result in differing requirements for aggregation of
constituent measures, but the mappings between levels allow the decision
maker to make an informed decision and understand the reasons for it. The
issues of measure causality, sufficiency and independence must be considered.
The analyst must decide if the decision maker's original queries have been
17
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addressed by the MCES analysis. Finally, suitable graphics should be prepared
for interaction with the decision maker.









Figure 9. Aggregation and Interpretation of Measures
The implementation of this module provides the analytical results
tailored to address the problem posed at the beginning of the procedure. The
results, made up of the aggregated values and measures, should be provided
to the decision maker in a format that will expedite his consideration of the




Finally the results are provided to the decision maker. Two courses of
action are available. First, the decision makers may identify the need for
further iteration. Or they may proceed to implement the decision. In most
situations, explanation of objectives and the reasoning behind the decision
help the implementation by lower levels of the organization. MCES is an aid
in conveying the context, structure and evidence supporting the decision to
these levels.
C ILLUSTRATION: POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE MCES TO THE
MARINE CORPS POM PROCESS FOR C3 ISSUES
1. Introduction
The MCES may be of value as a means of structuring analysis for POM
decision-making regarding MEB C3 issues. This section will discuss possible
advantages of the MCES in the POM environment, which has been briefly
witnessed by one of the research team members. It will be followed by a
general discussion of the difficulty of POM tradeoffs and in later sections by a
description of how such issues might be treated in each module of the MCES.
Later the MCES will be applied to the SINCGARS allocation problem in a
detailed manner leading up to an example of analysis of the SINCGARS
similar to that which could be accomplished for POM issues of particular
significance.
The discussion is limited to MEB C3. Broader issues clearly exist in the
POM but the MEB is a reasonable focus for a mission-oriented approach such
as MCES, which was designed for addressing single issues. If the MCES
approach to the MEB-level POM issues seems meritorious, projections of
application to broader issues could be developed.
19
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One of the difficulties of decision making in the POM process is the wide
variation in scope and level of the competing POM initiatives, i.e., roughly 1
million to 100 million dollars in yearly costs. MCES may be of benefit in three
ways: (1) standardized identification of mission and function so that the area
of impact of the initiative can be pinpointed, (2) relative assessment of the
contribution of the initiatives to solution of the problems they address in
their area; and (3) highlighting of potential interface and interoperability
issues or synergistic benefits of individual initiatives. Each of these three is
discussed below.
The first contribution of MCES is to provide a means of narrowing the
scope of each decision by identifying the areas affected by an initiative. This
will prevent sponsors of initiatives from citing benefits of all kinds to
everyone. Although this claim may be true to some extent, this approach
hampers decision-making. Even a quick, qualitative application of the MCES
results in an identification of the major applicability of an initiative. The
MCES requires identification of the following for each POM initiative:
1. mission area affected
2. command center elements impacted
3. C3 architectures impacted
4. C3 processes and procedures affected
5. major C3 hardware and software systems affected
6. possible environmental constraints (all-weather, etc.),
7. time frame of contributions in the field,
8. measures of force effectiveness, C3 system effectiveness and subsystem
effectiveness appropriate for measuring the impact,
9. a first cut of what would be necessary to generate the data to measure
the impact of the initiative, and
20
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10. a first cut at an aggregation of the information necessary to decide on
the cost effectiveness of the initiative.
If this information could be systematically available for each alternative,
it is likely that POM decision making could be more well-structured and
would waste less time on irrelevant definitional problems or third-order
claims of contribution.
As a simple example, consider Table 3. The two-dimensions of the table
are very aggregated mission by aggregated C3 function. Even at this level it
would be possible to identify the areas impacted by each initiative with time
frame of impact coded by short, mid or long term within the table. This
would enable decision makers to see the distributions of effort across mission
and C3 process and to identify possible overlaps, duplication or holes in the
total effort.















Addition of an assessment for the POM of the threat, baseline capability
and relative deficiency or net assessment of current capability in these
categories would be helpful in translating this table into decision making. Of
course finer division of mission and C3 process could contribute to the
identification but might make it more difficult to make the net assessment.
Additional dimensions from the list of ten above could also be added.
21
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Although this information could be collected without MCES, the rigor of the
MCES avoids distortion produced by sponsors' enthusiasm for their
initiatives.
In addition to the identification of the area of contribution of the
initiative, the MCES can give qualitative or quantitative assessments of how
much impact the initiative can make. A full quantitative analysis such as
will be illustrated for SINCGARS would be preferable but may not be possible
in the time-constrained POM environment. However, a qualitative analysis
can be performed relatively quickly. If presented in standardized MCES form,
these analyses could serve as the basis for judgmental or group decision-
making efforts to categorize the impact as: significant, marginal or negligible
in each relevant area, for example. With the cost of each initiative known, as
it is for most POM initiatives, relative cost-effectiveness could also be assessed
by the same qualitative methods.
Again these qualitative assessments could be done without the MCES but
the systematic rigor of MCES encourages critique of each initiative's weak
points and identifies incompleteness. It also makes clear how much
additional effort would be required to obtain dependable assessments and
therefore highlights the real uncertainty in the benefits of the initiatives.
Another way in which MCES contributes to the relative assessment of the
contribution of the initiatives, even without complete quantifiable
measurement, is the identification of measures of performance, measures of
C3 effectiveness and /or measures of force effectiveness for the initiative.
Even without knowing the quantitative values of these, it may be possible to
compare several initiatives simply by their obvious qualitative differences in
22
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impact on these same measures. Experience has shown that doubling of
measures of performance will generally have a much lower impact on
measures of C3 effectiveness (perhaps a 10-50% improvement) and only a
very minor impact on measures of force effectiveness (a few percentage
points) This gives some idea of a threshold for effectiveness of initiatives at
the measure of performance level. When costs of the initiatives are known,
it can also give a very rough indication of cost effectiveness because a C3
initiative that represents a large increase in the cost of a total force can rarely
be recovered in increased force effectiveness (Achilles heels excepted).
The third contribution of the MCES to POM assessment of initiatives is
the identification of interfaces of the initiatives with the existing C3 system.
This can be useful in two distinct ways. It helps identify what other C3
systems or processes will probably have to be improved in order to take
advantage of the initiative (or to make the initiative actually pay off)- Often
these impacts are overlooked by the sponsors of initiatives. It can also
indicate where interoperability must be carefully considered if the
effectiveness of the initiative is not to be totally lost because of inability of
other areas to meet the interface requirements. Incompatibilities of bit vice
character-oriented systems, data rates, message formats, etc., are also often
overlooked. These can add significantly to the final costs of C3 initiatives, as
can training in new processes or procedures which can also be identified by
the MCES.
2. Problems in C3 POM Decision Making
One of the first steps in dealing with a problem is to formulate the
problem in such a manner that it will be possible to determine when an
23
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answer has been identified. This involves a dilemma. One the one hand
everyone wants crisp definitive answers which will be immutable. On the
other hand everyone wants to keep their options open and not make
important decisions until necessary. The first leads to overly specific, detailed
answers to yesterday's problems. The latter leads to bland statements of
general principle without narrowing the scope of the problem. In the POM
environment it is easy to avoid decisions by delay and program stretch-out
rather than cancellation.
In general, MEB C3 problems can be described as the inability to ensure
that all levels of command will have convenient access to the information
needed to make timely decisions under all combat conditions. In the POM
environment it is easy to forget that more equipment is not necessarily the
answer. The ability to make good MEB C3 resource allocation decisions in the
POM requires selecting those systems which blend simplicity and flexibility of
performance with the benefits of newer technology including training and
supply constraints. For example an excellent system which requires
specialized training should not be assigned to frontline units where the only
specialist may likely become unavailable. Selection and allocation of new
systems must be harmonized with the totality of the existing complex C3
system. For example while information must be guarded from disruption by
the enemy, disruption can also occur from inadequate planning for the
tactical implications, doctrinal deviations and excessive training load of
inappropriate new systems or procedures.
Since C3 is a total system, the interoperability and compatibility of
elements is of paramount importance. Backward and downward
24
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compatibility and interoperability are crucial because of the long time for
adoption of most systems. But upward adaptability (P3I) and consistency with
long-run architecture is vital if today's decisions are not to handicap
tomorrow's options. In the POM decision-making, technological perspective
through time should be maintained. If the burn-in period of a new system
approaches its obsolescence time, it would be better to wait for the next
system. New technology itself is never a reason for replacement. The
technology must promise very significantly better performance without
training and logistical burdens before new investment is appropriate, unless
the existing system is a "dog." There are always other C3 areas which have
more pressing needs than "new and nice to have." Obsolete systems can be
assigned to high or low usage units as appropriate to ease transition such as
when one system must wait for others or when compatibility requires an
entire system to be replaced.
A particularly difficult aspect of resource allocation in C3 is that of combat
vulnerability and its tradeoff with field performance. The closer to the
combat environment, the more important is the simplicity, ruggedness and
short-term reliability of equipment and the need for extremely quick
response. These features can be jeopardized by multiple modes of operation
for security, anti-jam or low probability of intercept (LPI) protection.
However there is also the principle that the forward elements are closer to the
enemy and therefore more susceptible to attack, either physically or
electronically by jamming exploitation or direction finding (or self-jamming),
so these features may be overriding if the information is useful to the enemy.
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Similarly the lower in an organization that a system is placed, the more of
the systems that will be required by the organization. This implies a larger
training plan and higher logistical loads. Thus it is important that systems for
use in the company or battalion be very simple, rugged and reliable as well as
small and portable. High power, capacity or range are typically not needed in
these elements because of their geographic compactness.
Another dimension frequently overlooked is the hierarchical
interdependence of problems. What looks like a problem at the battalion
level may simply be one at the brigade level that has been pushed down to
the battalion. It is almost always easier to solve problems at higher levels
than at lower levels where more people are impacted. The only exception is
problems at the joint or combined level are often easier to solve at service
lower levels because it is difficult to get unity of command or interpretation
of the mission at high levels. In the POM environment many decision
makers are involved with differing backgrounds regarding the issues. A
standardized methodology makes it much easier for those not originally
involved to understand the reasoning of the others who have made earlier
decisions.
The discussion above should be sufficient to establish that problem
formulation for POM C3 resource allocations for the MEB is not an easy
matter. What guidance can the MCES give for problem formulation? The
most important is to frame the problem (question) in terms of the mission of
the force unit not that of C3 itself. More C3 will always serve the interest of
C3 but not necessarily of the force. C3 should not get in the way of fighting (or
of the training for fighting)! Ideally the question should always be "Can we
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show this resource investment is the best way to win the war?", or "How can
we kill more enemy with what we've got?" This focuses the question on
crucial aspects of using the forces to their fullest potential, not on providing
information that may itself not be used. This focus requires ability to identify
where critical problems will occur in combat—again a potentially very
difficult forecasting problem made easier by combat experience or realistic
exercises. But without such assessment it is easy to spend time fixing the
accessories or polishing the hood when the engine won't run or is out of gas.
Secondly the MCES actively encourages looking at the question broadly.
Many times C3 acquisition issues are substitutes for dealing with difficult
organizational issues or even training and doctrine problems. Better
planning and training are often a better answer to the need for more real-time
coordination circuits. A distributed graphic tactical picture is still better than a
thousand words, particularly if the local commander can select the picture he
wants without being inundated with extraneous information.
The MCES explicitly includes treatment of the dynamics of C3. Problem
formulation must take the time dimension into account explicitly. C3
problems are evolutionary, as are their solutions. A history of the problem is-
important. Requiring a time-phased plan that keeps options open and buys
information to take advantage of the options should be part of the problem
formulation.
Next the steps in the MCES are illustrated by discussion of applicability to
the C3 issues in the POM, keeping the difficulties discussed above in mind.
27
Sovereign—Task 1A MGES
3. Module 1 Problem Formulation—Precise Problem Statement
It is necessary to limit the scope of this discussion since 1) there are no
experts regarding the specific POM issues on the research team and 2) to keep
the illustration of the MCES as applied to the POM issues concerning MEB C3
within reasonable limits as an introduction to the later SINCGARS allocation
problem. POM decisions are strongly driven by cost and budgetary
constraints, changes in perceived threats, politics at all levels, technological
feasibility of a great variety of systems, etc., all of which are only tangential to
the SINCGARS allocation problem. Therefore discussion will be limited to
the question of how to elucidate POM initiatives for their total potential
impact on MEB C3.
The Marine Corps has a formal, quantitative process for selection of
competing initiatives in the POM. This process is based on the zero-based
budgeting requirements of the Carter-era POM process in which initiatives
are first priority-ordered and the resulting list is subject to a cutoff based on
cumulative budget. The process incorporates a procedure for quantitatively
measuring the relative benefit of each initiative. The benefit value for each
initiative is then divided by the cost and the ratio is used directly to order the
initiatives into a prioritized list. The prioritized list can then be cut off at
whatever budget is available. The entire list is subject to review by
knowledgeable officers at higher levels and adjustments can be made, but the
process is heavily dependent on the strengths of the ordered list and the
quantification of the benefit of each of the initiatives. Because of this




The zero-based budgeting technique of a prioritized list for budget cutoff
has two chief strengths. First, it makes quite obvious the truth that all
initiatives must compete for funding: that all ten pounds must fit into the
five pound budget bag. This truth is often not obvious to the sponsors of
competing initiatives, all of which have some merit. It is easier for sponsors
to accept that other initiatives are better rather than to be told that their
initiatives are not worth their cost. The second strength is the flexibility to
respond to fluctuations in the budget cutoff level. This is particularly useful
when a number of hierarchical decision processes are involved which make
allocation of total budget to the lower levels difficult to make. In this POM
process the lower levels can make up their "wish lists" without specific
budget targets available.
The weaknesses of the zero-based approach, which have led to its
abandonment in most of the government, are also two-fold. It assumes
independence of the initiatives and requires a complete ordering of the
initiatives when only a fraction of the initiatives will actually need to be
compared. These weaknesses are not controlling for the Marine Corps
because of the relatively smaller size of the Marine Corps compared to other
services.
The strength of the quantification method is that it can be applied when
more rigorous measurements are not available. Its weaknesses are in
handling multi-dimensional comparisons and multiple decision-making
levels. The method is often illustrated by the example of a person without a
scale ordering the weight of a set of rocks by comparison only, a task for which
the method is well suited. The method is much less valid for initiatives with
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many dimensions being evaluated by different groups. Moreover the method
generally assumes independence of the initiatives. Unfortunately this
assumption reinforces the assumption of independence in the zero-based
budgeting procedure and could lead to quite erroneous decisions if the
ordered lists are not thoroughly examined after the budget cutoff to make
sure that no essential elements are left out of the budget. This gross error can
be avoided by inspection and reinsertion of those initiatives below the cutoff
that are essential to those remaining within the budget cutoff. However it is
much more difficult to similarly correct the uni-dimensionality of the
method, particularly when combined with the zero-based budgeting
approach. Since the method orders on the basis of overall benefit, it may
over-emphasize one mission, geographic area, function or any other
subdivision of the total Marine Corps effort. The division of the benefit by
cost for priority ordering means that a particular subdivision may dominate
the list simply because it is cheaper to fix that particular problem. The
method leads away from a balanced POM particularly when reinforced by the
zero-based budgeting approach and especially during sizeable budget cuts.
This effect can be alleviated by placing large amounts of the budget in a
balanced "core" that is not prioritized, but this fix becomes less effective as the
core becomes larger but budget cuts affect more initiatives. This can be seen
in the extreme: if only a few initiatives could be afforded, they almost
certainly will not be well-balanced if only ordered by the quantification
method.
It is assumed that the Marine Corps feels that the current POM process is
acceptable. What are the features of the MCES that might offset the
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weaknesses of zero-based budgeting combined with the quantification
method? The major danger is that an unbalanced or incomplete POM can
result from interdependencies of the initiatives which are not addressed in
the methodology. To avoid this, MCES provides a means of subdividing the
POM into major missions or other areas affected by the initiatives. Moreover
MCES provides a means of looking beyond overall benefit of initiatives to the
specific contributions of each initiative to these missions. Even without a
complete quantification analysis it identifies interrelationships and
appropriate measures. Finally it gives an indication of what effort would
have to be expended to quantitatively show that an initiative is actually cost-
effective. This alone may lead to more realistic assessments by sponsors.
4. Module 2—System Bounding
The purpose of system bounding is to explicitly define the physical scope
of the problem. The outputs are lists or tables of the physical elements and
structures that enumerate the levels of the problems. Because of the
illustrative nature of this case and the breadth of MEB C3, the lists will not be
comprehensive or in the detail that will be provided in the SINCGARS
allocation problem.
The system of focus is the MEB C3. The conceptual name for this is the
Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS). It consists
of the people and the hardware and software systems in the operational
headquarters or facilities (C2FACs) of the MEB. The generic C2FACs are listed
as Table 4. There are subsystems of the MTACCS for ground C3, aviation C3,
combat service support (CSS) C3, and intelligence. Table 5 shows some of the
major third level systems under each of these. Some of these are currently
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under development while others are in place. The communications
elements are represented in the Marine Corps Tactical Communications
Architecture overview chart which cannot be reproduced at this scale but
which should be familiar to anyone involved in the POM C3 discussions.
TABLE 4. GENERIC C2 FACS (SELECTED)
A. COMMAND ELEMENT (CE)
1. COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC
2. INTELLIGENCE CENTER (IC)
3. SIGINT/EW COORDINATION CENTER (S/EWCC)
4. TACTICAL LOGISTICS GROUP (TACLOG)
5. SYSTEMS CONTROL TECH CONTROL (TECHCON)
6. REAR ARE OPERATIONS CENTER (RAOC)
B. GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT
1
.
COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC)
2. EMTELL CENTER (IN)
3. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER (FSCC)
4. ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER (ARTY FDC)
5. FORWARD OBSERVER (FO)
6. COMMAND POST (CP)
C AVIATION COMBAT ELEMENT
1 TACTICAL AIR COMMAND CENTER/DIRECTION CENTER
(TACC/SADC)
2. TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS CENTER/EARLY WARNING
(TACC/SADC)
3. DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC)
D. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENT
The elements above are related by certain structures, in MCES terms. The
primary well-defined structures are the command structure of the MEB
shown in Figure 10 by the C2FACS and the radio guard chart or the network
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structure which is shown in the MCTCA overview chart. These provide the
authority and conceptual connectivity for C3. Another well-defined structure
is that of the Marine Tactical Systems Message Text documents (MTS-MTF)
which define the information that flows within the networks in Volume IV
of the TPID. Apart from these hard copy messages, much of the specialized
computer to computer data flows in accordance with message series defined
by Tactical Automated Data Information Links (TADIL). This is part of the
interoperability structure which is available as needline tables of C2FAC
interconnection such as shown in the tables of the Marine Corps Tactical
Communications Architecture (MCTCA). Less well-defined structures are the
doctrine and standard operating procedures that are completely or partially in
place for existing and future systems. Access to data concerning the detailed
parameters of these systems and the structures in which they are
implemented is needed to make choices in the POM on MEB C3 issues. The
data however should be selectively organized to support the later modules of
the MCES or it can become overwhelming. In practice much of this less well-
defined data is available only in the minds of experienced personnel.
TABLE 5. MTACCS SYSTEM AND ILLUSTRATIVE SECOND AND THIRD
LEVEL SYSTEMS
Ground C2 System (Second Level)
Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) (Third Level)
Fireflex System (Third Level)
Aviation C2 System (Second Level)
Advanced Tactical Air Command and Control Central (ATACC)
Tactical Air Operations Module (TAOM)
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Combat Service Support System (Second Level)
Marine Integrated Personnel System (MIPS)
Logistics Automated Information System (LOGISTATS)
Intelligence System (Second Level)
Technical Control and Analysis Center (TAC)
Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Process and Evaluation System
(TERPES)
The forces supported by the MTACCS are those of the MEB and the naval
or joint forces that are supporting the MEB. Again, this includes the complete
force units with ground, air, and CSS elements, not merely their C3 in the
C2FACs. Understanding of the missions and capabilities of the forces is
important for predicting the payoff of C3 initiatives if measures of force
effectiveness (MOFEs) are used for assessment, as is most desirable. Within
the POM process this is largely left to the operational experience of the
participants.
The environment of the C3 system and the forces controlled includes the
physical environment (terrain, geography, weather), the threat, supporting
command structures including higher level commands and intelligence
agencies, as well as medical, training and other support structures for the
MEB outside of the CSS unit and finally the theatre and national level
communications systems. The diverse and rapidly changing environment of
the MEB means that a variety of systems report the intelligence,
meteorological, positional, navigational, and identification status of its
elements.
The rest of the world which does not affect the issues at hand is assumed
here to be everything not enumerated above. In reality, as mentioned at the
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beginning, many doctrinal, technical, and political issues affect the POM
decisions. Clearly those must be identified on an ad hoc basis.
5. Module 3—C3 Process Definitions
The C3 process consists of the functions that must be performed by the C3
system to coordinate forces in the planning and execution of their mission.
The MCES breaks the process into functions of sense, assess, generate, select,
plan and direct. The Marine Corps has a set of activities called Marine Corps
Basic Operational Tasks (MBOTs) which describe in detail the tasks of the
C2FACs in conducting, planning and executing the missions such as fire
control. These tasks are defined primarily in terms of messages that must be
passed between the generic C2FACs of the Marine Corps Tactical Command
and Control System mentioned above. These tasks are more detailed than
appropriate for some POM C3 issues but many of the participants would be
familiar with them from experience. The overall MBOT structure provides
the basis for more detailed analysis on major issues which are consistent with
quantitative modeling. This will be described in the SINCGARS application.
In lieu of a detailed study such as for SINCGARS, the MCES functions
provide a mental checklist for evaluating the completeness, balance and






























Figure 10. Organization Chart
6. Module 4—Integration of System Elements and Functions
This step identifies the interrelationship of the elements and structures
found in Step 2, system bounding, with the processes of Step 3. The result is
an architecture which assigns function to element. The Marine Corps has an
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architectural concept for C3 in the C2 Master Plan. Based on 1987 C2 plan, it
consists of the Landing Force Integrated Communications System (LFICS)
Architecture, the Marine Corps Communications, Navigation, Identification
(CNI) architecture and the Marine Corps Command, Control,
Communication and Computer (C4) System Architecture Capstone. These
architectures come together in the Marine Corps Basic Operational Tasks
(MBOTs) which designates activities for C2FACS and force units which were
identified in Step 3.
The C2FAC MBOTs however can be the though of as procedures for
members of an orchestra to play their individual instruments. A score or
scenario and a conductor or commander must be added to hear a symphony.
The symphony can be heard in the mind of POM C3 decision makers based
on their experience, or can be approximated by some exercise, test or
simulation if time is available. Usually the results of small scale tests or
simulations are available but it is up to the POM decision makers to
extrapolate to the effect on the whole orchestra playing various scenarios.
Part of the difficulty in POM decisions that explains variations in the decision
makers views is predicting the degree of skill which the players will reach
with new instruments or new scenarios which may call for changes in
training, doctrine or MBOTs. Reports of developmental and operational
testing should be available for POM decisions on C3 acquisitions but those
tests are usually focused at the operator level rather than on the performance
at MOE or MOFE level which would be more relevant for POM level
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The Marine Corps is already moving from manual, unsecure voice,
analogue radio-telephone tactical C3 to a significantly automated,
computerized, digital, secure telecommunications system. This requires that
the assignment of function to element (who does what) which is the
foundation of any architecture must become less flexible and more well
defined because the hardware and software replaces manual flexibility with
technically determined interfaces which must be compatible. The
architecture must specify standards for these interfaces or specialized
functions will become isolated even as they become more capable.
Conformance with defined architectures must be a criterion for evaluation of
initiatives in the POM process. MCES analyses of module 4 can identify
important interfaces that are not obvious when considered only as
communications or ADP systems.
7. Module 5—Specification of Measures
This module identifies what are the relevant MOPs, MOEs and or MOFEs
for decision making for an issue. The MCES emphasizes the importance of
MOFs and MOFEs. The Marine Corps apparently has no existing guidance
with regard to this module. Measures can be classified in several different
ways, for example quantitative vice subjective. Either may be appropriate in
the POM C3 decisions, but as more detailed analyses are performed,
quantitative measures are emphasized. For example, measures change from
only relative or categorical to those having precise physical units.
In general, measures relate either to performance; how well the system
does its job, or to vulnerability; how reliably it performs under stressed
conditions. Often high performance systems also have higher vulnerability
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partly because of the necessity of centralization or simply through error by a
specialized operator, which cannot be diagnosed or fixed by anyone else.
Twenty years ago, the TRI-TAC joint communications organization, later
to become the Joint Tactical C3 Agency, identified 6 specific measures of
performance and vulnerability effectiveness which have become standards
for communication. The TRI-TAC measures were shown in Table 1.
Performance includes measures of timeliness, quality, efficiency, and
convenience within a communications context. For example timeliness
measures include speed of service and call placement time. The quality of
service is measured by grade of service and information quality
(intelligibility) as well as lost message rate and intercept rate. Efficiency is
measured by spectrum utilization and ease of transition and interoperability.
Convenience includes transportability/ mobility and ease of reconfiguration.
Vulnerability is measured by survivability against destruction and against
jamming and availability. Fairly precise definitions were made by TRI-TAC
for each of these measures. Note that they are largely (with the exception of
survivability) scenario independent i.e. they can be determined from tests of
the equipments in laboratory environments. They are therefore generally
MOPs by the MCES hierarchical definition of equipment parameters, MOPs,
MOEs and MOFEs. The TRI-TAC measures are probably not of high enough
level for assessment of most POM C3 issues although they may be useful in
comparing alternative communications systems and for identifying




As noted above, POM C3 issues are now being dealt with by establishing
relative benefit without specifications of MOEs or MOFEs and with particular
attention to benefit-costs ratio. In a group decision making such as the POM,
detailed discussion and debate on lower level measures of performance,
MOPs or even equipment parameters, can preclude the more important
discussions of higher level measures, MOEs and MOFEs. Lower level
measures should of course be accurate but since they are often unknown or
vary with scenario, it can be useful to focus discussion on only the critical
MOPs as determined by review of higher level MOEs and their relationship to
the MOPs. This contrasts with simply identifying differences in the lower
level measures as is often the focus in POM discussions. MCES can help raise
the sights of the POM C3 issue discussions to higher level measures even
when the discussions must be qualitative. In comparison to the current
approach, MCES leaves a traceability of why one system was considered to be
better than another.
8. Module 6—Generation of Output
The purpose of this module is to combined the results of module 4, the
architecture, (the relationships of the elements and processes) with
techniques for generating the values of the measures chosen in module 5.
For most POM issues, where qualitative MOEs are to be evaluated by
judgmental or group decision making, the specific architecture may be
assessed directly by the individuals using qualitative categorical or relative
scoring. Often these assessment are based only on equipment parameters.
When more time is available, or when choices between quite different
systems, a model, test or exercise may be set up to provide quantitative values
40
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES
of the higher level measures. The model may be a detailed computer
simulation of the C3 functions as performed by the elements. Ideally this
model of the C3 system will serve as the decision making portion of a combat
model or can be interfaced to an existing combat model so that MOFEs can be
obtained. Both tests and models to POM issues are discussed briefly below.
The results of tests and exercises are particularly appropriate for both
direct assessment of alternatives or for validation of the model. Validated
models can then examine more scenarios than are possible in field tests. In
the POM decisions tests and exercises will have great impact but again
experienced extrapolation of test results will be necessary unless a model is
available.
Conducting tests requires that prototype or qualified systems are available
and that detailed training and doctrine have been adjusted to the new system.
Usually, this comes too late for many of the POM C3 issues. Therefore
models of varying complexity and validity are often used to produce values
for measures. Models require great amounts of data concerning the bounded
elements and the functions. Often much of the input structure and process is
undocumented except in the minds of experienced personnel. The MCES can
provide a template for determining whether a model was appropriately
matched to the issue. By identifying the important measures, MCES
establishes whether the outputs of the model were appropriate for the
decision. By establishing the elements and functions, it can indicate whether
the model had the right input data. Even simply bounding the system




The documentation of 1) the assumed scenario and architecture, 2) the
relationship and the approximations in the model, 3) the input data for
equipment parameters, environment, 4) any verification and/or validation is
very important to the credibility of the results for POM decisions. Often
considerable efforts at measurement both in testing and modeling are deemed
not credible by experienced decision makers. Following the MCES can help
avoid such waste of time and expenditure.
Even a well-documented model may generate non-credible results
without an appropriate experimental design which can establish the statistical
validity of the model under varying environments. Appropriate designs for
large-scale simulations require considerable time in both planning and
execution. Because of the importance of the man-machine interface to C3
systems and the difficulty of modeling human decision-making, C3 models,
as opposed to communication models, often call upon humans as elements.
These models are actually gaming systems. Thorough training of appropriate
human operators is particularly important in the testing of C3 systems with
games. Credibility depends upon the experience of the games and can be
enhanced by having the decision makers participate as in the Navy POM
games at Newport. Following the MCES provides a checklist to ensure that
the preparation of such a game is complete and that worthwhile answers will
be obtained. What is tracked is the overall relative benefit of the initiative
compared to others.
9. Module 7—Aggregation
Usually a number of measures with values will have been identified by
application of the MCES modules above. These measures must be aggregated
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to the highest degree possible so that the original question can be answered.
This includes an assessment of the credibility and sensitivity of the results.
In the case of the POM process, there are many issues being considered
simultaneously and most issues have inter-relationships with other systems
and issues. This makes for particularly complex decision making. One
reason for group POM decision making is to take advantage of the knowledge
of many individuals in identifying and keeping track of the
interrelationships. In the group decision making it is possible to keep track
and aggregate dollar costs across initiatives and years. There is currently no
organized means of tracking or aggregating measures of performance,
effectiveness or force effectiveness by mission or function nor the many
interfaces between systems. It may be possible to apply the MCES to
standardize formulation of POM C3 issues, to track interfaces and to aggregate
measures of effectiveness. The Table 1 shown earlier reflects one mechanism
for accomplishing this.
With regard to measures of effectiveness, using MCES may make it
possible to indicate the extent to which major force units are supported by C3
processes and systems. For example in air operations C3, the sense, assess,
generate, select, plan and direct cycle can be aggregated in timelines. A time
window for planning and targeting that would permit full sortie rates and
accurate ordnance delivered on target by Harriers or other aircraft could be
established and compared to current performance. The potential reduction
from current time could come from sensors, computers, planning aids or
communications. Thus each different system is compared on one MOE. This
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approach has been used in Air Command and Control System planning in
NATO's air defense system.
In summary, the MCES, although not devised for a POM decision-making
environment, could provide standardized information on the
interrelationships of C3 initiatives that would compensate for some of the




TASK IB MCES ANALYSIS OF SINCGARS ALLOCATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The Marine Corps plans to purchase over 12,000 frequency hopping VHF
SINCGARS radios of six different configurations. Half (6000) of these are the
man pack PRC-119 which will replace the existing PRC-77 and half are the
vehicular VRC-88 to 92 models which replace the VRC-12. They will be
phased in over about six years so there will be a long period when the
frequency hopping radio and the single channel PRC-77 and VRC-12 radios
must coexist. This raises a question of allocation of the new SINCGARS
within the Marine Corps. The final allocation will depend upon many
logistical and training factors but a primary factor should be the potential
operational impact in combat. The Warfighting Center has asked NPS for an
analvtical tool to address the relative effectiveness of alternative SINCGARS
allocations. Such a tool could potentially serve for architectural evaluation
for other new systems as well.
The NPS approach was to define the problem following the Modular
Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) and to model the
alternative network architectures with a flexible object-oriented simulation
written in the MODSIM language. Linking these two stages requires a
quantitative measure of C3 effectiveness. The development of the measure
of effectiveness is outlined in this document and a table of relative
performance values (penalties) for application of the measure is presented for
review by the Warfighting Center. Described in detail below, the quantitative
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measure of C3 effectiveness to be produced by the model will be the total
penalty-weighted time late of VHF messages. These messages are directly
linked to the C3 activities of the MAGTF by a scenario-independent set of
doctrinal tasks performed by Marine Corps C2 elements known as C2FACS.
With this measure and the simulation model, analyses can readily be
performed to test the robustness of any radio allocation to varying the rate of
tasks and the resulting increased message flow.
B. MCES
Module 1: Problem Formulation for SINCGARS allocation
The Marine Corps Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS)
concept expresses the requirement for rapid, reliable, secure, jam-resistant
mobile voice and data communications. These requirements are met by
SINCGARS, which has high capacity, promises a ten-to-one improvement in
MTBF, has built-in encryption, is virtually jam-proof, is light and can carry
either voice or data. Eventually SINCGARS may replace all existing VHF
single-channel net radios on a one-for-one basis. But during the long
changeover, there may be need (in fact there has been need!) for combat
operations by Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). SINCGARS is downward
compatible by operation in a non-hopping mode. However it thereby loses its
protection against enemy jamming and exploitation by direction finding.
Therefore it is likely that operational communications planners would in
general create separate nets for SINCGARS and for the older radios. If so, the
allocation decision can be thought of as the assignment of available
SINCGARS to the nets that most need a reliable, secure, jam-resistant capacity
to process the traffic it will encounter. Since the older radios can be secured by
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existing VINSON cryptos, the security issue will not be further addressed
here.
The problem then can be stated as: What assignment of available
SINCGARS to doctrinal nets will provide the most combat effective
communications? Our current understanding is that the SINCGARS will
become available at approximately 1000 per year with the earliest deliveries to
the materiel and training establishments in order to complete testing and fill
the maintenance and training pipelines. Once these pipelines are filled, the
assignment can be responsive to the potential workload and threat in
potential combat.
Module 2: System Bounding
This module identifies the environment of SINCGARS and the elements
with which it must interact. The SINCGARS is a convenient, general
purpose, VHF communications equipment which may appear in almost any
of the C2 facilities (C2FACS) of the Marine Corps. Most of the current VHF
single-channel capability is in the VRC-12 and PRC-77 radios so these are also
relevant portions of the total communications system to be examined. It is
assumed that any changes to the UHF, HF and multi-channel
communications networks will not affect the the VHF equipments.
Connectivity to non-Marine Corps units is not addressed because at the
tactical level of the MEB this would be rare.
An important MTACCS change is the planned increase in digital data
traffic from increased automation of the other systems of the MTACCS such
as TCO. SFXCGARS has a data capability up to 16 kilobits/sec, which is
compatible with current Marine Corps terminals. The current data terminal
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most likely to be used with SINCGARS is the hand-held Digital
Communications Terminal (DCT) which is very slow. Robustness to
increased data traffic must be considered. The "Green Machine" the Marine
Corps ruggedized IBM-compatible personal computer is being replaced with
the AN/UYK 83 and 85 which also have compatible data rates.
An important limitation of SINCGARS is the co-siting problem both with
itself and with other VHF radios. The mutual interference limits the ability
to have two SINCGARS operating antennas within several hundred feet.
Remoting of antennas is required for large C2FACs.
The other aspects of the physical environment of SINCGARS may be very
severe but, there is no reason to believe SINCGARS will have less ruggedness
than the current radios. SINCGARS is designed to Electro Magnetic Pulse
(EMP) hardness standards but only conventional combat will be considered
here.
SINCGARS is considered to be invulnerable to enemy jamming and
direction finding. The enemy threat to current VHF radios can be severe. In
particular mobile receivers near the front line may easily be jammed since
mobile antennas are not directional and terrain shielding is limited in most
mobile operations. Direction finding is a threat against fixed VHF radio but is
more likely to be used again the UHF and HF radios of more static higher
headquarters and will not be considered further here.
The major subsystems of the SINCGARS are the power supply, receiver-
transmitter, vehicular adapter-amplifier, high power amplifier for long-range
models, and antennas. The appropriate components are specified to be
acquired with models VRC 89-92 and the PRC-119. This study will not
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distinguish between these models since it is not known in general which
model the particular C2FAC will prefer. As noted above about half of the
SINCGARS are planned to be manpack and half are vehicular, which should
allow sufficient flexibility. Also, more than 10% are planned to have a
retransmission capability by the addition of a second power amplifier and
retransmission cable.
The SINCGARS will be compatible with NATO single channel VHF-FM
radios as well as existing Marine Corps radios of the PRC 25/77 and VRC 12
family (VRC 12/43/45/46/47/49/53/64 and GRC 125/160). The SINCGARS
will also be compatible with the airborne ARC-210 for ground/air
coordination. Aviation use of SINCGARS for air/ground coordination will
receive limited attention in this study since only a very small number of
SINCGARS are destined for aviation use. The SINCGARS will be utilized
and supported in accordance with Communications Electronics Operating
Instruction (CEOI). Generally they will be operated by specially trained
members of the C2FACs. The operational concept is that of self-use rather
than requiring a full-time operational specialist. Organizational maintenance
at first and second echelons is to be performed by the unit. This is primarily
battery replacement because of the long MTBF (over 1000 hours) and very
short MTTR (goal of 15 minutes at organizational level). The elements of the
SINCGARS allocation problem are sketched in the onion diagram in Figure
11.
Module 3: C3 Process Definition for SINCGARS Allocation
In this module the functions performed with the SINCGARS are
identified. The five Marine Corps mission areas are air operations, ground
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operations, intelligence, fire support and combat service support. The
MAGTF Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC) contains the
interface tasks performed in the Marine Corps which are similar to to the
MCES standard functions of sense, assess, generate, plan and direct.
Figure 11. Onion Diagram of SINCGARS Allocation Problem
Each of these functions is performed by a subset of the C2FACS in a
sequential fashion to accomplish the five missions. To capture these
sequences the Marine Corps Technical Interface Design Plan for Marine
Tactical Systems (MTS-TIDP) in its Volume II entitled Multiple Agency
Message Exchange Sequences (MAMES) defines a three levels of functions.
At the top level for each of the five mission areas are Marine Broad
Operations Tasks (MBOTS) such as artillery call for fire in the fire support
mission. Each MBOT is then subdivided, for example standard fire mission,
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check fire etc. These subdivisions are called Broad Operational Subtasks
(BOSTs). Each BOST is further subdivided into Message Exchange
Occurrences (MEOs). Each MEO explicitly identifies the origin and
destination C2FAC, the type of message sent and the net used for each MEO in
accomplishing the BOST. In addition, each MEO cross-references the interface
task which created it and the next interface task which its receipt supports.
The normal sequence of the MEOs is roughly indicated for each BOST. There
are as many as 50 MEOs for a BOST.
For purposes of this module it is sufficient to note that the BOSTs and
MEOs fully represent the tactical communication needs of the doctrinal C3
functions of the Marine Corps. The volumes of the TIDP contain a structured
representation of the required information flow in tactical operations since
Volume III is the Message Element Dictionary (MED) or data dictionary,
Volume IV is a Message Standard (MS) and Volume V is a Protocol Standard
(PS). Together these provide most of the information needed to complete a
simulation model of tactical communications in the Marine Corps, as will be
discussed in further modules. The only weakness of the MTS-TIDP is that
specific decisions required by the tasks are not identified, therefore the absence
of information or information quality can't be assessed in terms of task
quality. The execution of the MEOs, the BOSTs, and the MBOTs can be
addressed on the basis of their completion and how long they take, but not on
their quality from this data base, which is the most detailed functional
requirement we have been able to obtain.
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Module 4: Integration of Elements and Functions
In this module the C2FACs and the BOSTs are integrated into a
conceptual model of the VHF tactical communications networks. As noted
above this is possible because of the detailed definitional structure
represented in the MIRC and TIDP. The TIDP is implemented in a relational
data base which makes it possible to sort virtually any of the MEO
information into the structure required. For example Tab A of Volume II at
the TIDP lists the interface tasks and their C2FACs whereas Tab B of Volume
II sorts the C2FACs and lists their tasks.
Appendix A to this report lists SINCGARS C2FACs for the proposed
analysis. Appendix B lists the nets for the analysis of VHF-FM single channel
radio use has been added for review by the War Fighting Center for
appropriateness. The designation was made by reviewing each MEO to
determine whether it was a candidate for potential SINCGARS use. This was
designated if the net was specified in the TDP as VHF as opposed to HF, UHF
or MUX. Where several nets including VHF were specified, judgment of the
substitutability of each SINCGARS engagement was made. Appendix C lists
the potential SINCGARS nets of each C2FAC. This table allows judgement to
be made of the potential number of SINCGARS radios at each C2FAC. This
number can later be deduced given that a net has been selected for a
SINCGARS allocation.
Additionally designation of potential SINCGARS use in each MBOT and
BOST has been made for validation by the War Fighting Center. This appears
in Appendix D. The designation was based on the same process as above.
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With the information above, a crosswalk can be made from task or
C2FAC to SINCGARS net and vice versa. Additional information needed to
change the conceptual model to a quantitative includes estimating how often
the tasks must be performed or at least the relative frequency of the tasks.
This information was pursued but no definitive data were found. A
judgmental estimate can be made but a documented source cannot be found.
These rates drive the traffic load of the communications architecture.
The general architecture of VHF tactical communications has now been
established. Specific candidates of SINCGARS allocation to be evaluated can
be created by choosing nets based on estimates by planners or by general
principles such as giving SINCGARS to nets where traffic is anticipated to be
high or which serve units which will be in position to be jammed. The
conceptual model above identifies how many of these nets can be supported
by a given number of SINCGARS. It remains to be shown how to measure
the relative C3 effectiveness of alternative allocations of SINCGARS after the
candidates are subjected to traffic load.
Module 5: Specification of Measures for SINCGARS Allocation
In this module a set of quantitative measures for assessing alternative
allocations of SINCGARS to nets will be proposed. Measures of effectiveness
can be categorized by level (MOP, MOE or MOFE) or by categories such as
performance (how well the system does its job) and vulnerability (how
reliably it does the job under fire). Both of these dimensions will be discussed
below.
The highest and generally most desirable measures are those of force
effectiveness (MOFEs); MOFEs measure combat results for different
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alternatives. This is the final mission payoff, but it is often very difficult to
estimate how well a MAGTF would perform with different C3 systems. In
fact a well-trained MAGTF might fight just about as well with any C3 system
if given enough time to adapt its doctrine, training, personnel and procedures
to that system. It takes a major step forward in C3 to have a significant
improvement in MAGTF fighting performance. SINCGARS might be such a
step forward if the scenario was an assault operation against a fully-alerted
opponent heavily jamming with airborne or RPV jammers targeted against
time-critical Marine Corps operations. It might be possible to develop such a
scenario and a combat model to support it but none exists at this time to our
knowledge. Even if it did, it might be argued that such scenario-dependence
is not desirable in establishing SINCGARS allocations because of the need to
train for many contingencies.
The Warfighting Center gave NPS guidance that although some scenario-
dependence may be inescapable, it should be minimized in light of today's
changing circumstances. Therefore it may be more appropriate to step down
to measures of C3 effectiveness (MOEs) rather than MOFEs, keeping in mind
the MAGTF combat mission to the highest extent possible. C3 MOEs measure
how well the C3 system does its job and /or how reliably. The SINCGARS, as
a tactical communications equipment, contributes to C3 in the dissemination
of information and orders. The MBOTs, BOSTs and MEOs follow directly
from the five mission areas and identify specifically which messages must
flow in sequence to perform the C3 tasks. Thus a measure of how quickly and
reliably the SINCGARS executes the MEO message flows can directly measure
the Marine Corps' tactical communications effectiveness. The effect of
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changing scenario can be introduced by escalating to higher rates (with fixed
relative frequency). This would represent more difficult workloads and more
capable enemies.
A subjective allocation of SINCGARS could be made without a
quantitative computational model at this stage simply by asking experienced
officers to review the BOSTs and allocate the available SINCGARS to the
VHF networks that are most important (highest traffic and most
vulnerability). However, even experienced officers might have difficulty
deciding the tradeoff of traffic and vulnerability and thinking through how
the various nets would actually perform in each case. This is why a
quantitative model such as discussed in the next module is desirable.
The discussion above leaves open how the performance and
vulnerability would be measured in the quantified model. The performance
of a communications system can often be measured at the MOP level by
counting number of voice channels or number of bits/second. SINCGARS as
a single-channel voice radio does not offer major improvement over the
PRC 77 or VRC-12 in a benign environment. As a data communications
device it is superior. With a mix of voice and data traffic it is more difficult to
assess SINCGARS at the MOP level. Therefore a higher level measure (MOE)
is desirable. A C3 MOE that can be compared across communications,
processing and sensing is timeliness. Timeliness is closely related to combat
effectiveness if a time window exists for an operation i.e. if it is time critical.
In the single-channel radio nets timeliness, time to complete transmissions




Traffic workload can be obtained for a BOST from the MEOs as follows.
The length of each message can be calculated in bits for data or seconds for
voice (approximately). If relative frequency of the BOSTs can be estimated,
the traffic load on each net can be calculated, since the sequence of messages
(MOEs) is also known. As usual there may be transient delays even when
total capacity is larger than the workload. These transient delays could be
serious in fire support nets, during an attack for example. The total time late
measures this impact. Jamming would overload unjammed nets and result
in less timely completion of BOSTs.
The various missions may have varying sensitivity to timeliness. This
variability could be reflected by accumulating different penalties for each
second of time delay depending on mission. The penalty would be sized to
the relative importance of the time delay. The same penalties could be
assessed for any delay on a specific net or could be different for each BOST or
even for each MEO, since different messages and BOSTs are often transmitted
on the same net. Assessing delay penalty at the level of MEO seems too low
since a MEO is part of a BOST and does not represent completion of an
activity. In other words, a partial BOST (MEO) doesn't accomplish anything.
A penalty for each BOST seems most appropriate since a BOST represents a
complete military task relevant to a mission area. Therefore time penalties
will be assessed for each BOST. The total penalty-weighted time delay on the
networks would be a satisfactory performance measure of how well the single
channel VHF radios perform the C3 mission. An initial set of relative
penalties are shown in Appendix D for each BOST.
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The reliability aspect of the candidate architectures can be included in
timeliness. Reliability can be separated into inherent failure (MTBF and
MTTR), failure under attack (jamming or destruction) and operator failure
(user friendliness). These failures are quite different but can all be
represented by increased time delay to allow for repair or replacement,
jamming work around, or operator entry and restart. Some of these failures
would require additional input data concerning field conditions which are
not yet available for SINCGARS. However inherent failure and jamming can
be estimated and net entry time can be parametrically represented.
Module 6: Generation of Output Data
In this module a quantitative model is presented that would generate the
penalized time delay on the single-channel nets. It is an object-oriented
simulation written in the MODSIM language which can easily be
manipulated to provide the values desired. The model developed has four
fundamental object types, units, radios, nets, and the traffic generation object.
In this section, we provide the salient detail of the model by describing the
properties of these four object types. The unit object type is the base type from
which all of the MAGTF units are derived. Instances of unit objects range
from a platoon object (= 30 men) to a division object (= 15,000 men). The
communications equipment owned by a unit is housed in a radio array. Each
radio is, in turn, connected to a radio net. The differences between unit types
are the composition of the radio array and the rate of BOST initiation for each
type of BOST, and the net membership of the radios owned by the unit.
Each unit is stimulated by the traffic generator by having a stream of
BOST initiations sent to it. The unit then determines the first MEO of the
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BOST to pursue, finds all of the receivers which must receive the MEO, and
submits the MEO for transmission on all of the nets required to reach the
receivers. There are circumstances under which the unit will not be able to
reach some of the intended receivers on the net specified by BOST. Thus, the
unit contains a complex routing mechanism which determines the sequence
of units who will relay the BOST to the intended receiver.
Each BOST is being pursued via the execution of MEOs between units.
After a unit is a receiver of an MEO, it consults the BOST to determine the
next MEO. It determines the appropriate net using its routing mechanism,
then submits this new MEO to the appropriate set of radios, one radio per
radio net. The radio acts as a prioritized queue of MEOs, as well as possibly
initiating busy periods of the attached radio net. In order to test the value of a
specific C 3 architecture, the system must be stressed in a realistic fashion
independent of a specific scenario. The use of the MBOT/BOST/MEO
framework was briefly described above.
An example of an MBOT in air operations is Artillery Call for Fire, with
the constituent BOST Standard Call for Fire. This BOST might be initiated by
a Battery Forward Observer (BTRY FO). It involves the cooperation of the
Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center (BN FDC), the Infantry Battalion Fire
Support Coordination Center (BN FSCC), and the Artillery Battery Fire
Direction Center (ARTY BTRY FDC). The MEOs which are required to
complete the Standard Call for Fire include the original call for fire, the
clearing of the fire mission up the chain of command (optional), and the
relaying of the clearance back down the chain (optional), the spotting and
firing directions exchanged between the BTRY FO and BTRY ARTY FDC, the
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end of mission and surveillance messages. There is some concurrency of
MEOs in this mission, as well as a simple precedence structure between
MEOs.
Each of these actions is identified as a Task attached to one of the Message
Exchanges within the MEO. Each specified message has associated with it a
message format with the content identified message sender, receiver, radio
net to be used, and duration. Some Tasks are pursued concurrently, while
some have precedence over others.
To generate traffic for the MAGTF tactical communications system, a
sequence of BOSTs occurs at each unit. These BOSTs generate the specified
MEO with the associated message traffic requirements and sequence.
Each unit, j, in the MAGTF has an assumed rate of occurrence for each
BOST, i, given as A,y if it is an initiator of that BOST. Our traffic generation
scheme must produce BOST initiations at each of the initiating units at the
specified relative rates.
For efficiency and centralization of control, we will generate BOSTs in a
central process:
while (not TIME'S UP)
sample DELAY with mean = 1/A
wait DELAY
choose a BOST and UNIT
tell UNIT to INITIATE_BOST
end while
Algorithm 1. MODSIM Code for the BOST Generation Process
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where X = X
( , ;
)A,-,y. Given BOST i and unit /, the BOST-unit combination (i,j) is
chosen with probability A
2;
/A. If the delays are chosen to be exponential, then
each BOST-unit initiation is a filtered Poisson process. Otherwise, each time
between BOST-unit initiations is a sum of a geometric number of
independent identically distributed delays.
Radio net transmission time is the only limited resource in the model. A
net may be thought of as a one-talker-at-a-time party line. Units connected to
the net, called subscribers, all can receive every message transmitted on the
net, while only one subscriber may transmit at any time.
The nets in our model use a highest-priority-first message discipline,
which may be slightly more orderly than the real system. When an
opportunity for transmission takes place, the net polls each of the subscribers
and chooses a unit with a highest-priority message at random. With
penalties such as Appendix D for each BOST, a penalty weighted total delay
can be computed for any allocation of SINCGARS to the nets.
The model must be exercised within an experimental design in order to
provide statistically significant results. The experimental design will examine
alternative allocations of SINCGARS to various nets). The allocations of
SINCGARS to nets will be varied and the penalty-weighted time late
accumulated with and without jamming. The model may also examine the
effect of changes in the relative frequencies of the BOSTs and of values of the
penalties to determine sensitivity to these subjective inputs.
Module 7: Aggregation and Interpretation
In this module the results of the model in terms of penalized delay will
be displayed and integrated into recommendations for the Marine Corps with
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regard to allocation of SINCGARS during the transition to an all-SINCGARS
VHF single-channel capability. A discussion of the possible extension of the
model to other issues will be given.
The nature of the conclusions will be that certain nets are less robust for
increased intensity or rate of BOSTs than others under jamming and should
therefore be allocated SINCGARs when available. It is anticipated that this
behavior will not be sensitive to the absolute number of SINCGARS
available, but as more SINCGARS become available there will be less impact
of the allocation on total penalty-weighted delay.
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APPENDIX A. C2 FACS BASED ON 1ST MEB EXAMPLE
FOR TACTICAL NETS
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41 3TH PLT COB CMD
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APPENDIX C C2FACS AND THEIR TACTICAL NETS
EXAMPLE BASED ON 1ST MEB
1ST MEB COMMAND ELEMENT (MEB CE)
COC—MEB TACTICAL (TAC) NET
COC—MEB COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS)
COMCON—MEB COMMUNICATION COORDINATION (COMM)
IC—ECM CONTROL
A12 COMBAT ELEMENT (ACE) DIRECT AIR SUPPORT CENTER (DASC)
DASC—TACTICAL AIR REQUEST/HELO REQUEST (TAR/HR)
DASC—MECIAL BN EVACUATION COORDINATION
GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT (GCE)—3RD MARINE INF REGIMENT
COC—MEB TAC NET
COMCON—MEB COMM
COC—3RD MARINE COMMAND (CMD)
COC—3RD MARINE TAC
IC—3RD MARINE INTEL
FSCC—3RD MARINE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION (FSC)
FSCC—1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT CONDUCT OF FIRE (COF)
FSCC—1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT CMD
FSCC—1ST BN 12TH MARINE ARTILLERY REGT FIRE DIRECTION (FD)
1/3 BATTALION COMMAND POST (BN CP)—SIMILARLY FOR 2/3, 3/3
COC—3RD MARINE CMD NET
COC—3RD MARINE TAC
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APPENDIX D. TIME-LATE PENALTIES FOR BOSTS
The delay in performance of individual Basic Operational SubTasks
(BOSTs) from jamming or simply because of traffic may have differing effects
on performance of the Marine Corps missions depending upon the BOST.
Delay of a reporting task will not directly cause lives to be lost but delay to a
fire mission may. Therefore in aggregating total delay, the minutes of delay
should be given differing weights in calculating a C3 measure of effectiveness
based on timeliness. This appendix describes a set of relative weights or
penalties for each of the BOSTs.
Before describing the results however it is noted that the BOSTs have
been partitioned into those that are relevant to VHF single-channel nets and
those that are not. This reduces the number of penalties to be determined.
The BOSTs not considered are primarily the aviation and amphibious
landing BOSTs that are performed with radios of other frequencies or higher
capacities and are not candidates for SINCGARs. In addition the Combat
Service Support (CSS) BOSTs are not considered (with the exception of the
combat operations request for combat service support) in this baseline
analysis.
The initial set of penalties for the SINCGARS relevant BOSTs are given
in the accompanying table, Appendix D. They were estimated by relative
judgments of the research team with a base penalty of 100 for the standard fire
mission BOST under the call for force MBOT. Only a few BOSTs score higher
than this. In general those BOSTs that involve execution of immediate fires
have about 100 points and all others have lower penalties. Coordination of
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fire BOSTs have the next highest penalties, followed by planning and finally
reporting which have values of 5 to 10 points. This leaves room for combat
service support BOSTs to be added at a later date if desired.
The point scheme was designed to give an order of magnitude difference
in ratio values between the most time critical and least time critical combat
operations. We believe the order of penalties would not significantly vary
between individual raters although the penalty ratio might vary.
The penalties in this appendix are for each minute of delay or time late.
This could be measured from either initiation of the BOST or from some
threshold time after initiation based on precedence (i.e. 10 minutes for
FLASH messages) or other standard operating procedure or CEOI thresholds.
It would also be possible to extend the penalty structure to include a one-time
penalty for any delay above a threshold. This could provide additional
discrimination between alternative allocations but would be dependent upon
setting an acceptable threshold, which may be difficult to establish. If
required, the one-time penalties could be established as a multiple of the
penalties estimated above. The size of the multiple could be the same for
each BOST somewhere in the range of a multiple of 10 to 100 or could vary by
BOST category.
An additional hierarchical dimension to the penalties could be added to
reflect relative importance of the BOSTs as a function of whether they were
initiated by the platoon, company, battalion or brigade. With respect to fire
mission it is unlikely that there is any difference in the importance of the
message according to the command hierarchy. However for planning
messages or orders it can be argued that delay moving down the chain of
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command implies that many more units will be affected then by delay at the
bottom of the chain. Therefore it may be desirable to introduce a factor to
change some of the penalties based on command level. At this time the
initiators of each BOST are not yet specified so this refinement must wait
until data on frequencies of initiation of BOSTs by command level are
known. It is likely that a BOST will ordinarily only be initiated by one level
of command. The initial set of penalties then are shown in Appendix D as
penalties per minute of delay from initiation of the BOST.
68
Sovereign—Task 1A MCES








Cbse Air Support—Preplanned Mission







Control of Aircraft and Missions
Employment of Aviation Assets











Intelligence Planning and Direction
Determine Requirements
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Warfighting Plans and Orders
Submit MAGTF Operational Planning Data
Submit GCE Operational Planning Data
Submit ACE Operational Planning Data
Submit CSSE Operational Planning Data
Develop and Distribute MAGTF Operation Plans and Orders
Develop and Distribute GCE Operation Plans and Orders
Develop and Distribute ACE Operation Plans and Orders
Develop and Distribute CSSE Operation Plans and Orders
warfighting Ship to Shore Operations
Advise Navy Control Organization
Report Ship to Shore Movement
Advise Helicopter Control Agencies
Coordinate Personnel and Equipment Transfers
Coordinate Supply Build-up
Coordinate Beach Party Activities
Receive and Report Serial Status
Receive and Report Landing of Scheduled Waves
Receive and Report Serial Records
Submit Ship Disposition Reports
Warfighting Communication Procedures
Communication System Adjustment
Coordinate Communication System Troubleshooting


























Receive and Distribute Combat Data yes 30
MAGTF Operational Reporting yes 20
GCE Operational Reporting yes 10
ACE Operational Reporting no 10
CSSE Operational Reporting no -
Nuclear Event Reporting yes 50
NBC Attack Reporting yes 50
Request Additional Support yes 45
Coordinate Combat Activities yes 25
Coordinate RPV Activities yes 25
Environmental Information yes 20
Collect and Disseminate Weather Data no -
Fire Support
Artillery Call for Fire
Check Fire yes 125
Counterfire Radar (CFR) Fire Mission
Final Protective Fire (FPF) Adjustment
yes 130
yes 150
High Angle Fire Mission yes 100
High Burst/Mean Point of Impact Registration yes 40
Precision Registration—FO yes 40
Precision Registration—NAO/TAO yes 80
Standard Fire Mission—FO yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—Div Recon TM yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—Meb Recon TM yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—Meb RPV yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—Met Recon TM yse 100
Standard Fire Mission—MEF RPV yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—MEU Recon TM yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—MEU RPV yes 100
Standard Fire Mission—Regiment Artillery Obs TM yes 100
Suppression Fire yes 40
Call for and Adjust Fire—NAO/TAO yes 100
Close Air Support (CAS
Immediate Mission—FAC yes 120
Control CAS—NAO/TAO yes 120
Preplanned on-call Mission—FAC yes 80
Preplanned Scheduled Mission—-FAC yes 80
Preplanned Scheduled Mission—ASRT




Preplanned on-call Mission—FAC yes 100
Preplanned Scheduled Mission—FAC yes 100
Fire Planning
Coordinate Subordinate C2FAC Activities yes 25
Disseminate Coordination and Control Measures yes 25
Establish Coordination and Control Measures yes 25
Establish Target Processing Center no -
Position Naval Gunfire Radar Beacon Team yes 25
Request Allocation of Additional Fire Support yes 30
Request Supporting Arms Support yes 35
Resolve Fire Support Coordination Problems yes 30
Resolve Fire Support Conflicts yes 30






Aerial Recon Reports no -
Counterfire Radar Section Location Report yes 20
Fire Direction Center Reports yes 10







Naval Gunfire Radar Beacon Team Location Report yes 10
Observer/Controller Reports yes 5
Supporting Arms Reports yes 5
Survey Reports yes 10
Shelling Report (SHELREP) yes 15
Mortar Call for Fire
Registration Mission yes 40
Standard Fire Mission yes 100
Naval Gunfire (NGF) Call for Fire
Direct Support Naval Gunfire Mission no -
Direct Support Naval Gunfire Mission—RVP no -
General Support Naval Gunfire Mission no -
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